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ARGUABLY ARBITRARY:
TAXATION AND THE PHYSICAL
INJURY REQUIREMENT OF I.R.C.
SECTION 104(a)(2)
There will always be death and taxes; however, death doesn't get
worse every year.
-Unknown
To the average taxpayer, the appropriation of his hard-eamed in-
come by the government is unpleasant enough without arbitrarily
having to pay tax on something on which his neighbor does not.
When dealing with section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code,
however, this is exactly what happens. This provision and the arbi-
trariness in taxation it causes will be the focus of this Note.
Ben Franklin once echoed the sentiment towards taxation common
to many taxpayers when he observed that life comes with but two
equally unpleasant guarantees: death and taxes. If this is the case,
then one can blame Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution for
bestowing upon Congress the authority to effect the taxes.' Congress
primarily exercises this power through the Internal Revenue Code,
and with this power Congress possesses the ability to tax American
citizens in ways it sees fit. Although many of the Code's provisions
for distributing the tax burden are straightforward and well thought
out, some have characteristics the purpose of which is at best am-
biguous and at worst arbitrary and harmful. The latter is the case with
the modem version of I.R.C. section 104(a)(2), which until 1996 al-
lowed a taxpayer to exclude from income any amount received on
account of a "personal" injury.2 That year, however, Congress
1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States .... "). Of equal importance is the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which authorizes Congress to tax incomes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
2 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1995).
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amended the statute to allow exclusion from income only of recover-
ies for physical personal injury.3 In the following pages, this Note
will argue that this addition was ill-advised and that a better approach
would be to return the provision to its previous form.
The bases for this proposal are numerous. Because of inherent
ambiguities involving the nature and requisite degree of physical in-
jury as well as its relation to nonphysical harm, the amended section
104(a)(2) creates the potential for arbitrary treatment of tort victims
by the courts.4  More fundamentally, however, the addition of a
physical injury requirement to the statute causes it to deviate from its
underpinnings in the concepts of human capital and traditional tort in
which it has long found justification. Because of this lack of support,
distinguishing between those who have suffered a physical harm and
those whose injury is intangible is by definition arbitrary.
To put these contentions in the proper context, Part I of this Note
serves to define the scope of the argument as well as present hypo-
thetical cases that suggest some of the potential issues involved. Part
II illustrates the underlying purpose of section 104(a)(2) by examin-
ing traditional rationales for its existence while acknowledging some
of the inherent flaws of those rationales. Part III chronicles the his-
tory behind the statute's creation and evolution, while Part IV exam-
ines the legislative history behind the 1996 addition of the physical
injury requirement. Part V views the modem provision in light of its
traditional justifications and asks whether these reasons still work in
light of a physical injury requirement. Part VI, in turn, looks to the
statute's roots in traditional notions of tort and asks whether a physi-
cal injury requirement is consistent with this heritage. After conclud-
ing that such is not the case, Part VII will examine the relevance of
this lack of support from either traditional justifications or basic tort
law. Finally, Part VIII considers alternatives to the modem statute
before reiterating that a return to its previous form is in order.
3 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2004). Although it is outside of the scope of this Note, it is worth
noting that a taxpayer whose recovery does not qualify for exclusion under section 104(a)(2)
may have another option. In 1974, the Treasury issued Revenue Ruling 74-77, which held that
a recovery for a claim of alienation of affection did not constitute income. Rev. Rul. 74-77,
1974-1 C.B. 33. Curiously, the ruling made no mention of section 104(a)(2) in reaching its
conclusion, and it has never been officially revoked. Id.
4 Or by the IRS in those cases that do not create litigation.
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I. SCOPE OF NOTE AND POTENTIAL ISSUES
A. Scope
Since the 1996 enactment of the Small Business Protection Act,5
section 104(a)(2) has excluded from income, and thus taxation, "the
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as peri-
odic payments) on account of6 personal physical injuries or physical
sickness."'7 The key addition provided by the Act was, of course, the
requirement that any harm be physical in nature in order for a recov-
ery on its behalf to be excludable from taxable income.8
Attempts at exclusion from taxation under section 104(a)(2) tend
to fall into one of two categories. In the first instance, the recovery at
issue is received as compensation for a traditional tortious
injury-auto accident, wrongful death, defamation, or the like.9 The
second kind of situation involves amounts received for civil rights
violations, such as discrimination and other statutorily-created harms.
Generally, suits in this second category are filed against current or
former employers; the point at issue in those cases is whether the re-
covery in question represents back or lost wages on one hand or com-
pensation for a personal injury (for example, discrimination) on the
other. °
Both types of situations raise unique issues." The civil rights type
cases are more straightforward as recoveries and are usually classified
5 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755
(1996).
6 For a discussion on the nature of the "on account of' requirement, see infra Part III.
7 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2004).
8 See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2004). The previous version of the statute likewise had been in
place only since 1989 and will be discussed infra. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1995).
9 See, e.g., Francisco v. United States, 267 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2001) (dealing with recov-
ery from an auto accident; dispute over portion of recovery attributable to "delay damages");
Chamberlain v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 2d 764 (E.D. La. 2003) (involving swimming injury
caused by another's negligence; dispute over interest income); Kovacs v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 124
(1993) (dealing with a wrongful death action; dispute over interest income).
10 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (examining taxability of recovery
obtained under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
233 (1992) (questioning taxability of back pay received for sex discrimination); Young v.
United States, 332 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a settlement from employer for lost
wages, humiliation, embarrassment, and so forth was taxable; moreover, the physical injury
requirement of section 104(a)(2) was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
requirement).
I One well-covered topic not pertinent here is the taxability of contingent attorney's fees
paid out of such recoveries. For an overview of some of the general issues, see Karl L. Mar-
schel, Note, It's a Property Issue: The Proper Treatment of Contingent Fees Under the Federal
Tax Code, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 323 (2003).
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as back wages, thus making the nature of the injury itself irrelevant.12
The issues involved in the other category of cases-those that involve
a traditional tortious injury-are not as clear-cut, however. As a re-
sult, this Note will focus on these cases, for it is in such instances that
the true problems caused by adding a physical injury requirement to
section 104(a)(2) come to light.
13
Although a physical injury requirement would initially seem to
provide a clear definition of, perhaps even a bright-line rule for,
which kinds of awards for traditionally tortious injuries beget taxable
compensation and which do not, upon closer inspection this is not the
case. For instance, what degree of physical injury is required for ex-
emption under the statute? Is mere pain enough? Or is something
more required, such as a broken bone? What about a situation where
what is initially a nonphysical harm (say, defamation) eventually
leads to physical injury or sickness? These are important questions,
and as will be illustrated in this Note, they expose a rift created be-
tween the current section 104(a)(2) and the traditional justifications
for its existence. This deviation and the ensuing ambiguity in the tax
code create the undesirable potential for arbitrary treatment of tax-
payers and therefore require change.
Just as important as the problems raised, however, is the existence
of potential alternatives: while the current version of the statute leaves
something to be desired, is there a better option? As litigation in the
area is sparse, 14 these are but a few of the questions that have yet to be
answered in regards to section 104(a)(2). In proposing that Congress
return the statute to its pre-1996 form, this Note will highlight and
attempt to address the importance of these issues.
B. Hypothetical Situations
Perhaps the best way to understand some of the issues raised by
the physical injury requirement of section 104(a)(2) is to consider
what might happen in hypothetical situations. Consider the following
scenarios as the Note progresses; the discussion will return to these
cases later.
12 See Burke, 504 U.S. at 242 (holding that award received was for back pay and not dis-
crimination). The result in Burke is typical for this kind of case. Further, Congress has made it
clear that such recoveries of wages are to be included in income. See infra Part IV.
13 Note that the facts of some of the cases analyzed deal with civil rights type recoveries,
but the substantive law is applicable to both categories of cases. Further, the requirement that
an injury be "personal" is common to any excludable recovery under section 104(a)(2). Thus,
for the purposes of this Note, nonphysical harms such as contractual and property damages are
irrelevant.
14 For more on the possible significance of this, see infra Part VII.
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Charlie Rogers was a respected second-grade teacher at an elemen-
tary school where he had been employed for a number of years. He
lived in a small Ohio town, and due to his tenure as an educator was
well-known throughout the community. Not everyone liked Charlie,
however, and a disgruntled parent made a convincing (albeit totally
false) case to the local newspaper that Mr. Rogers was actually a sex-
ual predator. Because of Charlie's position and the closeness of the
community, the ensuing story caused quite an uproar. Before an in-
vestigation could clear Charlie's name, students' parents demanded
that the formerly esteemed educator be removed from his position.
Charlie was forced to resign soon thereafter.
Although subsequent inquiry revealed Charlie's innocence of any
wrongdoing, the damage had been done. He had lost both the job he
loved and his only source of income. Furthermore, enough suspicion
remained in parents' minds to prevent any local school from rehiring
him. As bills mounted and Charlie unsuccessfully tried to find work
and reconcile with the community, the stress took its toll and he suc-
cumbed to a long bout of pneumonia. In the meantime, he success-
fully sued both the town newspaper and complaining parent for defa-
mation.
Charlie's friend, Abe Wilson, likewise had a tumultuous year.
While walking his dog early one morning, Abe was hit by a drunk
driver. The accident left Abe a paraplegic, and although this did not
affect his ability to work, it greatly affected his lifestyle. Abe sued
for the injury and recovered a handsome award from the driver's in-
surer.
Like Charlie and Abe, Jane Doe did not have the best of years. As
she was an aging widow and avid pianist, most of Jane's pleasure in
life came from charitably tutoring local children on how to play her
favorite instrument. While walking early one evening, however, she
was also hit by a drunk driver returning from the local watering hole.
The accident crushed most of the bones in her right hand, and, al-
though pins and multiple surgeries eventually allowed her to perform
common tasks, she could never play the piano with the hand again.
Jane sued the driver and recovered for her medical bills as well as the
emotional distress caused by being deprived of her primary joy in life.
Notwithstanding the common specters of misfortune and litigation,
the situations of these three people seem at first quite disparate. Sec-
tion 104(a)(2), however, serves as the glue that binds them. As all
three parties received recoveries for some legal harm, all of the com-
pensation given as a result of their injuries is potentially excludable
from taxable income under that section. The initial results of the hy-
10432005]
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pothetical cases may be similar in that the victims all recovered for
their injuries; likewise, the taxability of each recovery is subject to the
same statute. As will come to light throughout the course of this
Note, however, the current version of section 104(a)(2)'s physical
injury requirement could cause each party to find him- or herself with
different, if not questionable, results.
II. RATIONALE FOR EXCLUSION FROM INCOME UNDER SECTION
104(a)(2)
A necessary first step towards evaluating the validity and efficacy
of any statute is consideration of the purpose that the provision aims
to serve. In the case of section 104(a)(2), the statute has traditionally
relied on the theory of human capital to justify its existence,' 5 al-
though an argument can also be made that the provision is simply the
result of Congress's wanting to act kindly towards victims. 16
A. Kindness to the Victim
The simpler of the two approaches-the idea of kindness towards
injury victims-is straightforward enough. Reasoning in this case
suggests that, although a victim has recovered for his injuries, he has
nonetheless suffered a wrong to his person. As such, the government
should not add to his troubles by sending the tax collector to his door.
As will be illustrated subsequently, this view roughly comports with
section 104(a)(2) but falls apart when Congress begins to distinguish
harms that are excludable under the statute from those that are not.
B. Restoration of Human Capital
1. Background
While the notion of kindness by Congress is helpful as a basic ex-
planation for section 104(a)(2), throughout its existence the policy
behind the provision has primarily been attributed to the theory of
restoration of human capital.' 7 Human capital is in turn a variation on
15 O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 85 (1996) (acknowledging that Congress likely
sought to codify the theory of human capital in enacting the provision).
I6 Note that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. See F. Philip Manns, Jr., Restor-
ing Tortiously Damaged Human Capital Tax-Free Under Internal Revenue Code Section
104(a)(2)'s New Physical Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 354 (1998). Professor
Manns suggests that when and even if kindness is the underlying policy behind section
104(a)(2), that kindness dissipates when the parties have a preexisting economic relationship.
Id.
'7 O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 85.
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the concept of return of capital, itself a common concept in tax law.'
8
Before even considering the theory of human capital, as such, one
must first understand the concept of return of capital and its relation
to taxation.
One of the fundamental notions of taxation is that for a taxpayer to
have income he must have enjoyed some sort of gain; otherwise, there
would be nothing to tax. 19 Under the Supreme Court's holding in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,2° income was defined as any
"accession[] to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer[]
[has] complete dominion. Essentially, to determine whether an
amount received is income under Glenshaw Glass, it must be consid-
ered whether the sum is actually an addition to what the taxpayer pre-
viously possessed that has left him in a better position than that in
which he started. If that is the case, the recovery would be income
and taxable (in theory, at least); if not, it would not be beyond the
reach of the IRS.
The return of capital theory, with which the concept of human
capital is closely related, fits comfortably with the Glenshaw Glass
holding and is actually quite simple. Under this theory, when a tax-
payer loses an asset-for example, a building burns down-and sub-
sequently gets that capital (or its equivalent) back through insurance
proceeds, damages from litigation, or some other means, he has not
22been placed in a better position than before or received any income.
To the extent that it replaced his basis in the property, the "gain" en-
joyed by the taxpayer in such a situation is only a substitute that re-
turned him to the position in which he found himself before losing the
capital. Thus, the logic goes, why tax him on it? Clearly, there is no
accession to wealth.
18 See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 307-08 (1918) ("Without affirming that the human body is
in a technical sense the "capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the
proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go, capital which is the source of future
periodical income."). But see Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets
Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 64 (1997).
Professor Hobbs questions the basis for the Attorney General's opinion, suggesting that the
relationship between 104(a)(2) (and its predecessors) and the theory of human capital may have
gotten off to a rocky start. Id. Still, the theory appears to be the most prevalent and most logical
basis for 104(a)(2), and this Note will so argue.
19 WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 77 (5th ed. 1999) (noting
that "[a] central defining characteristic of income is gain").
20 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
21 Id. at 431. Note that this definition of income is not exclusive-the Supreme Court's
actual holding was "[h]ere we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly real-
ized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Id.
22 Note that this is applicable only to the extent that payment received replaces the tax-
payer's cost basis in the capital. Any recovery received beyond that amount will generally be a
taxable gain.
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The theory of human capital is analogous to the concept of return
of capital. Under the human capital theory, every person has "capi-
tal" in his own body and person. When one is injured, he is deprived
of use of that capital for some period of time (if not permanently)
much in the same way that a building owner whose facility burns
down can no longer use the premises. As such, when an injured per-
son receives compensation for an injury-whether through insurance
payments or damages received through litigation-the amount should
not be taxable as it basically functions to "restore" the person to his
former state.
2. Flaws with the Theory
Although the theory of restoration of human capital is the best
available to justify section 104(a)(2), it is admittedly not perfect.
Two issues exist with the theory, with each one raising unique issues.
First is the question of where human capital is actually created. Sec-
ond, and more fundamental, is the matter of what actually makes up
"human capital."
a. Where is human capital created?
Three potential explanations exist as to the origins of human capi-
tal. First, one could argue that every person is born with a fixed
amount of capital of which he can subsequently be deprived through
24injury. The problem with this idea, of course, is that it would result
in one experiencing a Glenshaw Glass accession to wealth immedi-
ately upon birth.25 One commentator aptly summed up the situation
potentially arising from such a concept of capital: "[b]esides being
ludicrous, taxing an individual at birth would resemble a capitation or
head tax that would have to be apportioned under the Constitution. 26
A second explanation for the origin of human capital posits that
one is born with a small amount that increases as the person ma-
27tures. This view suggests that through education, physical growth
and experience and other "assets" bestowed by parents and others, a
person's level of human capital increases with maturity. As much of
23 This assumes, of course, that substitution for one kind of asset (cash) for another (bod-
ily integrity) is acceptable.
24 One problem with this idea: what about the handicapped? Are they simply born with
less human capital than others and thus any compensation for injury would be more likely to be
income? This is unclear.
25 Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75
DENY. U. L. REV. 61, 63 (1997).
26 Id.
27 The credit for this idea goes to my advisor, Prof. Dale Nance.
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what might be considered human capital (either in terms of physical
strength, skills or other "assets") accrues over time and not immedi-
ately upon birth, this seems a more plausible explanation than the first
approach.
A third theory as to the origin of human capital holds that the cost
of human capital is actually zero and thus any recovery for injury
constitutes income.28 The very existence of the physical injury exclu-
sion under section 104(a)(2), however, suggests that this concept has
not found its way into the tax code. 29 Regardless of which theory for
human capital's origin one accepts, as of 2005, the Internal Revenue
Code contained no specific provisions requiring taxation of the hu-
man capital bestowed upon one at birth or accrual, so for now this
point seems moot.
30
b. What is "human capital"?
The second issue with human capital, and one that brightly illumi-
nates a schism between post-1996 tax treatment of injury under sec-
tion 104(a)(2) and the theory itself, is determining what exactly con-
stitutes human capital. If one accepts that a taxpayer has capital in his
own body, it follows that a person also has capital in his mind and the
synapses and neurons that make it work. Damage to one's mental
functions-for example, emotional damage-would thus be a loss of
capital. 31 As such, payment for emotional distress should constitute a
nontaxable return of human capital. Section 104(a) specifically pro-
vides that such recoveries are not excludable under the provision,
however.32 Likewise, one can argue that a taxpayer has capital in his
reputation. Thus, in such a scheme damages received on account of
28 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 64.
29 Admittedly, this argument cuts both ways: the provision's existence could suggest ei-
ther a recognition that there is simply no gain when one recovers for injury, or, on the other
hand, that there is a gain but Congress felt some need to exclude the gain from taxation. This
Note will assume that the former is the case.
30 Although section 61 of the Code specifically declares what kinds of gains can constitute
income, the list is not exclusive. See I.R.C. § 61 (2004). To the best of this author's knowl-
edge, however, no court has ever held that one incurs a liability to the IRS upon emerging from
the womb, nor has the issue even arisen. Further, the administrative problems in trying to
quantify additions to human capital for the purpose of taxation would be overwhelming and
likely quite arbitrary.
31 Not only would such harm be a loss of human capital, such injury generally coincides
with actual physical changes in the body. For more on this point, see infra Part V.
32 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2004) ("For purposes of [damages received on account of personal
physical injuries or physical sickness], emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical
injury or physical sickness."). Keep in mind that just because a recovery does not fall under the
provision does not necessarily mean that it is automatically taxable. In theory, other means of
avoiding taxation may exist but they are beyond the scope of this Note.
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harm to one's reputation through defamation or other dignitary torts
should be a return of human capital.33
This is not the approach taken by the Internal Revenue Code, how-
ever. The questions thus present themselves: how did the statute
reach its current state? Perhaps more important, why has it deviated
from what was an apparent foundation in a pure theory of restoration
of human capital?
34
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAXING COMPENSATION RECEIVED FOR
INJURY: How WE ARRIVED AT THE PRESENT-DAY SECTION 104(a)(2)
By examining how and why section 104(a)(2) reached its present
state, one can begin to understand the problems with the current ver-
sion of the provision. When determining what may or should be ex-
cluded from taxable income by section 104(a)(2), it is likewise impor-
tant to consider what exactly constitutes income in the first place.
The Supreme Court provided a useful definition of income when it
stated that
[t]he definition of gross income under the Internal Revenue
Code sweeps broadly. Section 61(a) provides that "gross in-
come means all income from whatever source derived," sub-
ject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere
in the Code. As this Court has recognized, Congress intended
through § 61(a) and its statutory precursors to exert "the full
measure of its taxing power," and to bring within the defini-
tion of income any "accession to wealth [clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayer[] ha[s] complete dominion]. 35
With this in mind, in making changes to the Internal Revenue
Code Congress must consider the question: what should constitute
income? Because Congress writes the Code and can essentially ex-
empt from taxation whatever it pleases, the answer to this question
can vary-and has done so-along with the policies motivating the
legislature.
Section 104(a)(2) and its predecessors fit into the scheme of defin-
ing income by attempting to clarify what should and what should not
be taxable when compensation is received for some tortious injury, be
it physical or otherwise. The statute's predecessors date as far back
33 Doti, supra note 26, at 64 (arguing that "the victim's untainted reputation in the com-
munity is no less a birthright than an uninjured body and mind").
The implications of the theory on how section 104(a)(2) should treat taxpayers is con-
sidered infra Part VII1.
35 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) (citations omitted).
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as 1918. Importantly, earlier in that same year the Attorney General
had issued an opinion suggesting that insurance proceeds received
from an accident should not be taxable. In doing so, he discussed the
idea that insurance proceeds were really a return of capital:
[I]n a broad, natural sense the proceeds of the policy do but
substitute, so far as they go, capital which is the source of fu-
ture periodical income. They merely take the place of capital
in human ability which was destroyed by the accident. They
are therefore "capital" as distinguished from "income" re-
ceipts.36
This philosophy was essentially codified by Congress when, later
that year, it enacted the Revenue Act of 1918,37 and gives credence to
the notion that, from its inception, section 104(a)(2) has been based
on the concept of restoration of human capital.38
A few years later, in 1920, the Supreme Court decided Glenshaw's
predecessor, Eisner v. Macomber.39 In holding that a stock dividend
paid by a corporation was not taxable, the Court defined income as
gain received "from capital, from labor, or from both combined. ' '4°
This view of income persisted for nearly four decades, when the
Court finally changed its stance in Glenshaw Glass.
When the Supreme Court decided Glenshaw Glass, not only did it
provide a definition of income that stands to this day-any clearly
realized accession to wealth over which the taxpayer has complete
dominion-it also judicially sanctioned the idea of return of human
capital as a rationale for excluding personal injury recoveries from
taxation. 41 At the time, compensation for nonphysical personal inju-
36 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). But see Hobbs, supra note 19, at 64 (arguing that
"[a]lthough the Attorney General's human capital approach to accident recoveries may have had
merit in the abstract, the theory was unsupported by existing tax doctrine."); Doti, supra note
26, at 65 (also noting a "misunderstanding" starting with the opinion).
37 Revenue Act of 1918 §213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1918). The Act excluded
"[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workman's compensation
acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages re-
ceived whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness." Id. See also
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 85 (1996) (suggesting that Congress sought to codify
this approach).
38 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 65 (suggesting that "[i]t is clear from the single paragraph of
legislative history accompanying the provision that Congress was simply incorporating into the
Code the Treasury's treatment of such amounts [the Treasury's behavior having been influenced
by the Attorney General's opinion]").
39 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
40 Id. at 207. The Court reasoned that because the stock dividend lowered the value of the
shares themselves, there was no gain or loss in terms of the shareholders' overall wealth. Id.
41 Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
2005] 1049
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
ries was exempt from taxation (albeit not statutorily).42 Because this
nonphysical exemption was based on Macomber's much narrower
concept of income, Glenshaw Glass provided an opportunity to re-
consider the validity of the exception, should the Supreme Court
question it.43 This did not happen, however. Shortly after the Court's
decision in Glenshaw Glass, in fact, the Internal Revenue Service
issued numerous revenue rulings on the subject. Although none of
these rulings explicitly mentioned Glenshaw Glass by name, the Ser-
vice reiterated its position that recovery for nonphysical personal in-
jury was not taxable.44
Although the exemption of nonphysical injuries from taxation re-
mained relegated to case law and revenue rulings for a number of
years, in 1983 the Ninth Circuit effectively merged the nonstatutory
exclusion with its physical injury statute-based cousin in Roemer v.
Commissioner.45 In Roemer, an insurance agent sued a credit com-
pany for issuing a defamatory report and was awarded damages by a
jury.46 In holding against the taxpayer, the Tax Court distinguished
between harm to personal and harm to business reputation.47 The
Ninth Circuit found this distinction improper and further found that
the Tax Court's decision "illogically distinguishes physical from non-
physical personal injuries.48 The court went on to add that
[t]he relevant distinction that should be made is between per-
sonal and nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and
nonphysical injuries. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) states that damages
received on account of personal injuries are excludable; it
says nothing about physical injuries .... The ordinary mean-
ing of a personal injury is not limited to a physical one.49
Other courts quickly adopted the Ninth Circuit's position, even
though Congress had yet to expressly codify this view by making the
nonphysical exception statutory.50
42 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 70.
43 Id.
4 Id. (citing numerous Revenue Rulings from 1955 through 1958). Among other things,
Hobbs points out that these rulings excluded from income sums received by former World War
II POWs for violations of the Geneva convention as well as for prisoners involved in the Korean
War. Id.
45 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
6 Id.
47 Roemer v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
48 Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
49 Id.
50 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 74.
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In 1989, however, Congress finally addressed the courts' view of
physical and nonphysical injury exclusion when the House of Repre-
sentatives proposed an amendment to section 104(a)(2). The change
would have limited exclusion from taxation to compensation received
for "personal injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury
or sickness.' As such, the conference committee considering the
report found that the exclusion should not apply "where no physical
sickness or injury is involved., 52
The committee, however, eventually decided on an amendment
with a result that has been described as having "achieved expansion
by contraction. 53 Instead of an explicit limitation to physical injury,
the final version of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
added that section 104(a)(2) "shall not apply to any punitive damages
in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness. 54 Thus, by making only punitive damages for nonphysical
injuries taxable, Congress implicitly allowed section 104(a)(2) to
cover-and thus exempt from taxation--compensatory damages for
nonphysical injuries. Further, any court examining the legislative
history of the amendment would see the failed attempt to limit the
exclusion to recoveries for physical injury, and could thus reasonably
believe that Congress's intent was to include all recoveries for injury
in the exclusion. The courts that interpreted the amendment did ex-
actly this, and those that had not done so already proceeded to em-
brace the Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer.55
Although it has never explicitly defined what constituted a physi-
cal injury, the Supreme Court weighed in on the scope of section
104(a)(2) two times between 1989 and the provision's eventual
amendment in 1996. Both of these cases, and another heard follow-
ing the 1996 amendment, would have an important effect on how the
provision was viewed and its application.
51 H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989) (emphasis added). At the time, the statute al-
lowed exclusion from taxation of recoveries received on account of "personal injuries or sick-
ness." The proposed amendment would simply have changed this to recoveries received on
account of "personal injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness." Id.
52 H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1355 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2825.
3 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 75.
5 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 7641(a), 103 Stat.
2106, 2379 (1989) (emphasis added).
55 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 77.
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A. United States v. Burke: Establishing the "Tort-Like" Requirement
In United States v. Burke, 6 the Supreme Court took a key step by
formally approving a link between section 104(a)(2) and traditional
tort principles. Burke involved taxpayers who had been awarded back
pay for sex discrimination under the pre-1991 version of Title VII,
and the IRS had denied the taxpayers a refund for taxes paid on their
recoveries. 7 In its analysis, the Court noted that IRS regulations
formally linked identification of a "personal injury" (the "physical"
requirement had not yet been added to the statute) for purposes of
section 104(a)(2) to traditional tort principles, saying such an action
must be based on "tort or tort type rights. 58 Even though the court
examined the basic definition of a tort, an action based on tort should,
the Court concluded, be identified through the remedies available to
the plaintiff. Further, the Court noted that Title VII did not compen-
sate for "pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or
other consequential damages. 59
In the immediate case, Title VII did not entitle the taxpayers to
what the Court considered traditional tort remedies: trial by jury,
compensatory or punitive damages. 6° Because Title VII provided
none of these, the court found the plaintiffs' recovery not tort-like and
thus includable in income.61 Importantly, however, the Court had
formally acknowledged section 104(a)(2)'s roots in traditional princi-
ples of tort, and notably required an action to be tort-like in order for
its resulting proceeds to be excludable under the statute.
B. Commissioner v. Schleier: Adding a Causation Requirement
A mere two years after Burke, the Supreme Court heard another
section 104(a)(2) case in Commissioner v. Schleier.2 In Schleier, the
Court revisited Burke and attempted to clarify its earlier holding by
declaring that the tort-type requirement for excludability was actually
the first prong in a two-part test. Specifically, the court held that
though Burke relied on Title VH's failure to qualify as an ac-
tion based upon tort type rights, we did not intend to elimi-
nate the basic requirement found in both the statute and the
56 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
57 The older version of the statute allowed only for back pay damages; the later amended
version provided for both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 232.
58 Id. at 234.
19 Id. at 239.
60 Id. at 238.
61 Id. at 242.
62 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
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regulation that only amounts received "on account of personal
injuries or sickness" come within § 104(a)(2)'s exclusion.
Thus, though satisfaction of Burke's "tort or tort type" inquiry
is a necessary condition for excludability under § 104(a)(2), it
is not a sufficient condition.63
The case itself involved an airline pilot fired upon reaching the age
of 60 in accordance with company policy. The taxpayer had sued
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the parties had
settled, with half the settlement amount designated as back pay and
half as liquidated damages. 64 In its analysis the court found that the
settlement was not "on account of personal injuries or sickness" and
thus not excludable from income.65 According to the court, the tax-
payer's recovery failed the causation element of its test because "[i]n
age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and
loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount of back
wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or extent
of any personal injury., 66
To illustrate the "on account of' causation requirement, the Court
used the example of an auto accident. In such a case, the accident
causes injuries which in turn directly result in medical expenses, lost
wages, as well as pain, suffering, and emotional distress. If the in-
jured party recovered for all three claims, the entire amount would be
excludable "as being 'on account of" personal injury.67 The Court
thus found that the back pay awarded Schleier was not excludable
from income as it was not "on account of' the discrimination suf-
fered.68 Further, the Court suggested that each element of the recov-
63 Id. at 336. This was not novel-"on account of' had been in the statute itself all along.
64 Id. at 326.
65 Id. at 336.
66 Id. at 330.67 Id. at 329. Keep in mind that the Court was considering the pre-1996 section 104(a)(2)
which lacked the physical injury requirement. The exclusion of wages-whether "on account
of' injury or not-is curious in light of the fact that they would have otherwise been income.
68 Id. at 330. The Court added:
Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on ac-
count of his age as the proximate cause of respondent's loss of income, neither the
birthday nor the discharge can fairly be described as a "personal injury" or "sick-
ness." Moreover, though respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some
psychological or "personal" injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering
caused by an automobile accident, it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of
back wages is attributable to that injury. Thus, in our automobile hypothetical, the
accident causes a personal injury which in turn causes a loss of wages. In age dis-
crimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but
neither is linked to the other. The amount of back wages recovered is completely in-
dependent of the existence or extent of any personal injury.
Id.
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ery must be "on account of' the injury in order to be excludable from
income.69
Put another way, Schleier held that to be excludable from income
under section 104(a)(2), a recovery had to meet two conditions. First,
the statute providing for the award had to have a tort-like remedial70
scheme; and second, the damages had to be for personal injury.
Thus, the case's key addition to section 104(a)(2) analysis is the cau-
sation requirement that each element of a recovery be "on account of'
the injury that caused it.
As will be illustrated below, while acceptable in theory this condi-
tion can become problematic when considered in light of the physical
injury requirement of the modem statute.
C. O' Gilvie v. United States: No Punitive Damages on Account of
Personal Injury
The case of O'Gilvie v. United States, decided shortly after the
1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2), considered whether punitive
damages were "on account of' personal injury.7' In doing so, the
court essentially affirmed its view that section 104(a)(2) was based on
a human capital rationale, stating that punitive damages "are not a
substitute for any normally untaxed personal (or financial) quality,
good or 'asset.' They do not compensate for any kind of lOSS.72
Thus, although the court had recently stated in Schleier that even lost
wages received on account of personal injury could be excludable
from income, it took the opposite (and seemingly inconsistent) ap-
proach with punitive damages and held such an award was includable
in income.73
While the Supreme Court had addressed what was required of a
recovery for injury in order to make it excludable under section
104(a)(2) (award must be on account of a tort type injury), it never
adequately clarified exactly what constituted a personal injury. In
1996, however, Congress itself attempted to clarify the statute's scope
69 Id.
70 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 81. Because discrimination is a statutory tort and all the losses
claimed must be caused by the discrimination (otherwise, they would not be recoverable), the
Court appears to have read "personal injury" as narrower than "tort." It is unclear, however, if it
means to say that "personal injury" is no broader than "physical injury."
71 519 U.S. 79 (1996). Note that the case was decided shortly after the 1996 amendment
to section 104(a)(2) but considers the pre- 1996 version of section 104(a)(2).
72 Id. at 86-87.
73 Id. at 92. Important to the Court was the purpose of punitive damages-to punish the
defendant. The inconsistency in the holdings lies in that lost wages that were normally taxable
would be excludable from income, whereas punitive damages, which likewise would normally
be taxable, remained so.
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and late in the summer of that year the Small Business Job Protection
Act became law. Although the focus of the Act was on small busi-
ness tax legislation, Congress needed to raise additional revenue to
offset the tax relief the Act offered to small businesses.74 In order to
achieve this goal, Congress attempted to narrow the scope of exclu-
sion from taxation under section 104(a)(2).
Replacing the older statute that allowed tax exemption of compen-
sation received for personal injuries or sickness, the new version lim-
ited exclusion to "the amount of damages (other than punitive dam-
ages) 75 received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical inju-
ries or physical sickness. 76 Further, the statute explicitly proclaimed
that "emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or
physical sickness. 77
With this change, Congress was partly reacting to a perceived ten-
dency of courts to read the previous statute too broadly and noted that
some jurisdictions had included such harms as employment discrimi-
nation-the remedy for which would be in the form of lost or back
wages-in the definition of "personal injury. 7 8 Moreover, Schleier
had recently held that damages received from a claim brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act were not excludable from
income under section 104(a)(2), 79 and the IRS had subsequently sus-
pended guidance on the taxability of damages received on account of
other forms of employment discrimination.8°
While the revised statute makes it clear that punitive damage
awards are not excludable under the provision, the rest is not as
straightforward as it may initially appear. As a result, the previously
mentioned ambiguities involving physical harm arising from a non-
physical tort, degree of injury, and other issues arise, and inconsis-
tency with the underlying theory of restoration of human capital be-
gins to become apparent.
74 Hobbs, supra note 19, at 82.
75 This essentially codified O'Gilvie before the case was even decided.
76 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2004) (emphasis added).
77 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2004) (emphasis added).
78 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1792 (note that this is for the House version of the bill, which is the one adopted in conference).
As will be discussed, however, the true underlying reason for the change is far from clear.
79 Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
80 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1792.
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IV. THE LOGIC BEHIND THE LAW: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
CONGRESS'S PURPOSE IN ADDING THE PHYSICAL INJURY
REQUIREMENT
As has been suggested up to this point, IRC section 104(a)(2) and
its predecessors have enjoyed an intriguing, though not entirely con-
sistent, history. For decades, compensation for nonphysical personal
injury was exempt from taxation under the statute before perceived
judicial expansion of the doctrine caused Congress finally to declare
otherwise through the Small Business Job Protection Act. The 1996
alteration can hardly be seen as sudden, however, as it is clear in
hindsight that as early as 1989 Congress had aspirations of making
the change.81 The question thus becomes: by narrowing the provision
to require a physical injury, was Congress trying to bring it in line
with what it perceived to be a human capital approach? Perhaps
Congress was considering the statute's tort-based roots or the sug-
gested altruistic nature of the provision. Maybe Congress was more
concerned about a perceived tendency of the judicial system to apply
the statute too liberally. Or perhaps a major consideration was simply
the bottom line-increasing revenue to offset the tax breaks offered
by other portions of the Act. As it turns out, Congress's underlying
rationale seems to have been based on a combination of factors.
The logical focus for an analysis of congressional intent would be
the legislative history behind the 1996 amendment and the Small
Business Job Protection Act. Although that history is not sufficiently
comprehensive to be determinative, it does provide some guidance.
The House Conference Report notes that
[c]ourts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of
damages received on account of personal injury or sickness
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury that
do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For example,
some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages
in cases involving certain forms of employment discrimina-
tion and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury
or sickness... [These damages] generally consist of back pay
and other awards intended to compensate the claimants for
lost wages or lost profits.82
81 See discussion supra Part 1II (discussing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989).
82 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1792 (emphasis added).
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One problem exists if such logic was indeed the driving force be-
hind the addition of a physical injury requirement: if this were truly
the root of Congress's concern, why did Congress not simply amend
the provision to exclude from income only those recoveries that did
not compensate the claimant for lost wages or profits? Drawing a
distinction between physical and nonphysical injury is hardly the
most efficient means by which to address such a concern.
Although the report makes reference to Schleier in support of its
position, 83 another possible reason for the change that is not men-
tioned is that Congress feared a flood of frivolous claims (i.e., suits
alleging that a large portion of damages came from emotional distress
and other difficult-to-prove, nonphysical injuries) were it to allow the
exclusion to encompass all types of harms.84 One problem, however,
is that the provision had allowed exclusion of recovery for nonphysi-
cal injury for years, and Congress offered no evidence of such a fear(or even a suggestion that this was even an issue in the first place) in
the legislative history.85
Interestingly, the history adds that although emotional damage is
not a physical injury for purposes of the statute, recovery for a claim
of emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or sickness
would be excludable from income.86 Similarly, damages for "loss of
consortium due to the physical injury or physical sickness of [one's]
spouse are excludable from gross income. 87 This suggests that the
requisite physical harm need not always be suffered by the party re-
ceiving the recovery; under the Schleier "on account of' test, the
damages would be received because of the spouse's injury, not be-
cause of the harm the injury causes to the taxpayer. In fact, the report
explicitly states that "[i]f an action has its origin in a physical injury
or physical sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages)
that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account of
83 Id. (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court recently held that damages received based on a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be excluded from income."
The report goes on to point out the fact that in light of that decision, the IRS had suspended
existing guidance on other forms of employment discrimination, suggesting a need to clarify the
issue).
84 As noted, however, the legislative history is silent as to any reason for the change be-
yond the perception that courts tended to interpret the existing statute too broadly.
85 Even if this were a reason for the amendment, a logical flaw exists behind this argument
that will be discussed infra Part VIII.
86 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1793. Note that it is not clear from this part of the text whether the physical harm must be
suffered by the taxpayer. The treatment of loss of consortium claims, discussed infra, seems to
suggest that it does not matter.
87 Id.
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physical injury or physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the
damages is the injured party."
88
In the end, the legislative history behind the addition of a physical
injury requirement to section 104(a)(2) sheds light in two ways. First,
it suggests that Congress disapproved of the courts' tendency to apply
the statute too broadly in favor of taxpayers, specifically in allowing
awards that essentially constituted back wages to be exempt from
income tax. This is of limited value, however, given that Congress's
reaction was the legislative equivalent of using a chainsaw to do a
scalpel's job. Second, it clears the air somewhat as to nonphysical
injury caused by physical harm, although it remains conspicuously
silent as to the opposite situation.
Otherwise, the legislative history unfortunately serves mainly to
recite the provision that it supports albeit with slightly different word-
ing. There is no mention of excluding from income compensation
that substitutes for capital, nary a word on any altruistic motive of the
legislature, and no mention of the provision's close connections with
tort. As a result, the history's value as a gauge of why Congress felt
the need to limit exclusion from taxation to physical injuries is of
limited value other than suggesting that Congress needed to raise
revenue and failed to use the most narrow means by which to allay its
alleged fears. It sheds little light on why Congress made a change
that risked severing section 104(a)(2) from the justifications on which
the provision had long relied.
V. SECTION 104(a)(2) AND TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS: Do THEY
STILL WORK?
Because Congress provided little insight into the fundamental pur-
pose underlying the modem incarnation of section 104(a)(2), in con-
sidering the provision's validity it is necessary to look at the rationale
for the existence of its predecessors and whether the modem statute
stays true to those roots. If the provision remains consistent with its
traditional justifications, then there exists a logical explanation for the
results produced by the statute; if not, these same results run the risk
of being completely arbitrary. Although in this case the provision's
existence has traditionally (and as recently as O'Gilvie) been attrib-
uted to the desire not to tax what is essentially a return of human capi-
tal, some have also suggested that the provision exists merely out of
an altruistic desire of Congress not to further burden those who have
suffered harm.89 As the so-called "kindness" rationale is the simpler
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 See supra Part I.
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of the two, its legitimacy as a justification for the modem section
104(a)(2) will be examined first.
Under the kindness rationale, section 104(a)(2) exists simply be-
cause of Congress's good will towards tort victims.90 This approach,
however, is not supported by the post-1996 provision, or even by the
1989 amendment. A general underlying motive of compassion to-
wards taxpayers would not be supported by a provision that picks and
chooses what the injured may or may not exclude from their incomes.
The 1989 requirement that punitive damages be included in income
would seem to call the validity of the kindness rationale into ques-
tion-if Congress simply felt that victims had "suffered enough,"
why pick and choose what they can and cannot exclude from taxable
income? 9' If any uncertainty remained as to the viability of the kind-
ness rationale as a justification for the statute, however, the denial
from exclusion of recoveries for nonphysical injury-arguably a sub-
stantial sum in many cases-removes what little support remains.
Thus, while the idea of Congress's altruism was never the primary
justification for section 104(a)(2), it carries little weight under the
statute's modem version and its distinction between physical and
nonphysical injuries.
As authorities rarely rely on the kindness rationale to justify the
existence of section 104(a)(2), the lack of a meaningful relationship
between the theory and the provision is not problematic. On the other
hand, the concept of not taxing a return of human capital has been
frequently suggested as an underlying purpose for the statute, even to
the point that the idea has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court.92
Under the human capital approach, the exclusion granted by section
104(a)(2) exists because awards for injuries to one's person simply
compensate the victim for "capital" in their person lost or destroyed
by a tortious action.93 Essentially, the victim in such a case has ex-
perienced an involuntary conversion 94 of one asset-their body orperson-for another, cash.95 Further, although the recovery in such a
90 See Manns, supra note 17, at 354-55. Manns suggests that this rationale fails when the
parties involved had some preexisting economic relationship, when contract rights come into
play.
91 Admittedly the argument can be made both for and against exclusion of punitive dam-
ages from income depending on just how altruistic Congress should be in enacting a provision
such as section 104(a)(2). Picking and choosing might just be an effort to provide the optimal
amount of generosity.
92 See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 307 (1918); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
93 Recall the scope of this Note-traditional tortious injury. In the case of the other class
of cases under section 104(a)(2)-discrimination and other employment-related suits-the
recovery would likely replace lost income, not destroyed human capital.
94 See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 63.
95 In addition to the traditional human capital rationale, there is also the question of fair-
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case is simply a substitution of one asset for another, the extreme dif-
ficulty in quantifying the value of the destroyed human capital would
make any alternative approach overly cumbersome.96
Under the human capital theory, it makes sense that neither wages
(either of the lost or back variety97) nor punitive damages would be
excludable from taxable income. Even ignoring the O'Gilvie holding
that punitive damages are not on account of personal injury, both
wages and punitive damages constitute amounts that would have been
taxed otherwise. They do not represent compensation that substitutes
for harm to a person (even though the punitive damages would not
have been received without the initial harm), and as a result they are
an accession to wealth and taxable.98 Thus, as far as punitive dam-
ages and substituted wages go, there is no issue with the theory's sup-
port of section 104(a)(2).
Inconsistencies arise, however, when one determines that compen-
sation substituting for physical injury should be excludable from taxa-
tion while compensation for nonphysical injury should not. Such a
distinction necessitates one of two assumptions. First, it can be as-
sumed that one has no human capital in his person outside of his
body-i.e., mental health, integrity, character, and reputation are
worth nothing even though the body itself can be theoretically re-
placed by dollars. Second, the distinction may suggest an assumption
that although one has capital in the intangible parts of his person, this
human capital cannot be harmed, or at least that money cannot serve
as a substitute to replace such damaged capital.
Given the physical/nonphysical dichotomy introduced to the tax
code in 1996, it seems likely that in amending section 104(a)(2) Con-
gress made at least one of these assumptions. As a taxpayer's human
capital includes both physical and intangible assets, making either one
of these assumptions would seriously undermine the idea of the the-
ory as a basis for the statute. The inherent conflicts between such a
view and the theory of human capital are clear. For one, to argue that
a person who suffers a broken arm experiences a loss of capital while
ness in taxing one who has experienced an involuntary conversion of capital.
96 The inherent problem in alternative approaches is that they would require placing a dol-
lar value on the use of various body parts. How much money substitutes for the loss of use of
one's arm? $1? $100? $1000?
97 "Lost" wages are income that would have been earned subsequent to the injury but, be-
cause of the injury, the victim was unable to work. "Back" wages are income for which one has
already worked, but because of discrimination or some other type of action the person has not
been paid the funds. The two terms sometimes seem to be used interchangeably, however.
92 This does make the Supreme Court's holding in Schleier that lost wages received on ac-
count of personal injury were excludable seem curious, however.
1060 [Vol. 55:4
ARGUABLY ARBITRARY
one whose public reputation (and hence ability to obtain gainful em-
ployment) is tarnished does not borders on absurd. Even if one were
to accept this, many nonphysical harms such as depression and emo-
tional damage involve actual physical changes in the body, most often
in the brain.99 One does not become depressed or distraught without
actual physiological changes in his person.' ° Thus, by requiring a
showing of "traditional" physical injury, the statute fails to protect
taxpayers who have suffered a physical harm brought about by a non-
physical injury.
Further, another inconsistency exists in that even though Congress
made physical injury a prerequisite to exclusion under section
104(a)(2), the provision's legislative history explicitly states that one
can exclude from taxable income recovery for a loss of consortium
claim for harm to a spouse.' 0 ' While one could argue that the harm
suffered by the taxpayer is indeed physical in such a case, 10 2 an
equally good claim exists that the injury suffered is an emotional loss
coupled with deprivation of emotional support. Notwithstanding the
physiological changes caused by emotional harm, the destroyed hu-
man capital would be nonphysical; well-being, happiness, and other
intangibles that exist as a result of one's relationship with his or her
spouse would be destroyed. If this is indeed why recovery for such a
harm is excludable from income, it would be consistent with the idea
of human capital but in direct conflict with the treatment such dam-
ages normally received under section 104(a)(2). Why should such a
recovery be excludable from income simply because another party
suffered a physical injury?
Regardless of whether Congress believed that one cannot have
capital in his intangible personal attributes or simply felt that money
cannot substitute for such assets, the scarcity of support for either
contention in the legislative history bolsters the logical conclusion
that Congress ignored the consideration altogether. The result is that
the theory of human capital can no longer provide justification for
99 See Narbeh Bagdasarian, A Prescription for Mental Distress: The Principles of Psycho-
somatic Medicine with the Physical Manifestation Requirement in N.I.E.D. Cases, 26 AM. J.L.
& MED. 401, 427-28 (2000) (noting that mental injury and physical injury are not separate and
distinct types of harm, and that "all emotional disturbances necessarily possess some physical
aspects") (quoting Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 618 n. 169 (1982)).
100Bagdasarian, supra note 100, at 427-28.
101 H.R. CONE. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1793. The pertinent text states that "[i]f an action has its origin in a physical injury or sickness,
then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments
received on account of physical injury" before using a loss of consortium claim as an example.
102 This author will spare the reader the details in this instance. Consider, however, an eld-
erly woman who was forced to care for her disabled husband even before the accident.
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section 104(a)(2), as distinguishing between physical and nonphysical
assets is fundamentally inconsistent with the theory's underlying no-
tion that a person has capital in all aspects of his person.
VI. DOES THE MODERN SECTION 104(a)(2) REMAIN TRUE TO ITS
ROOTS IN TORT?
When it decided United States v. Burke, the Supreme Court linked
identification of a personal injury, the recovery for which was exclud-
able under section 104(a)(2), to traditional tort principles. 0 3 While
the court looked to available remedies to identify a tort, Black's Law
Dictionary has defined the term as "[a] private or civil wrong or in-
jury" or "[a] wrong independent of contract." A tort can be either
"(1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the
infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to
the individual; [or] (3) the violation of some private obligation by
which like damage accrues to the individual."''04 Likewise, a personal
injury "is one 'which is an invasion of personal rights and ... may
include such injuries to the person as libel or slander ... and mental
suffering."" 5 Notably, in Burke the Supreme Court acknowledged
that such a nonphysical harm-there, discrimination-could in some
cases constitute such a personal injury under section 104(a)(2).
10 6
Although nowhere in either definition (or in the Treasury Regula-
tion on which the Court relied, for that matter) is there a requirement
that in order to be tortious a harm must be physical, that is precisely
what Congress added in 1996. By the Supreme Court's own admis-
sion and by a regulation issued by the Treasury itself, a personal in-
jury for purposes of section 104(a)(2) is based in tort. By adding a
requirement that an injury be physical, however, Congress omitted a
plethora of tortious actions from the coverage of the provision. As
such, not only does the post-1996 statute fail to find justification in a
human capital or kindness rationale, it is not reconcilable with the
fundamental principles of tort on which it purportedly relies.1
0 7
103 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,234 (1992) (citing 26 C.F.R. §1.104-1(c) (1991)).
104 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1660 (4th ed. 1968).
105 Donald J. Zahn, Personal Injury Exclusion: Is the Slashing of Wrists Necessary?, 13
AKRON TAX J. 129, 150 (1997).
106Burke, 504 U.S. at 239. Recall that the Court looked to Title Vl's remedies in holding
otherwise in that case.
107 See Zahn, supra note 106, at 150. Zahn suggests that Burke and Schleier had added a
physical injury requirement even before the 1996 amendment.
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VII. THE LACK OF A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT: WHY DOES IT MATTER?
While adding a requirement of physical injury for exclusion under
section 104(a)(2) may not comport with ideas of kindness, human
capital or even tort, such inconsistency will not likely be a harbinger
of the Apocalypse. The flaws are, after all, theoretical, and the Con-
stitution possesses no requirement that the tax code be logical. There
do exist, however, two practical reasons why adding a physical injury
requirement to the provision was not a wise decision. For one, be-
cause the statute has been separated from any logical justification, any
results it produces will be arbitrary by definition. As far as the statute
is concerned, there is no reason why a taxpayer who has suffered a
physical injury should be able to enjoy the benefits of the provision
while one whose injury is intangible should not.
The second and more problematic result of the physical injury re-
quirement is that the lack of a clear definition of physical injury, the
uncertainties as to the result when physical injury arises from non-
physical harm, and other issues create ambiguity in the statute. Deal-
ing with such ambiguity is the province of the judicial system, and in
all likelihood the taxpayer will often get the short end of the stick as
the Supreme Court has made clear that exclusionary provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code must be narrowly construed. 08 Even if this is
not the case, however, ambiguity leads to the potential for arbitrari-
ness; because courts are left to concoct their own definition of physi-
cal injury in borderline cases, taxpayers with identical injuries may
receive different treatment under section 104(a)(2) in different juris-
dictions. Further, under a scheme that protects only those with tangi-
ble injuries, tax-conscious plaintiffs will have an incentive to "find"
physical harm where none may have previously existed.
The problem, however, is that section 104(a)(2) is not per se am-
biguous and thus in need of replacement, as it is capable of function-
ing well in basic cases.' °9 It is not a statute that screams for attention
because of the patently unjust results it produces. One instance where
it functions quite well is that of Abe, the hypothetical man who be-
came a paraplegic after being hit by a drunk driver. In a negligence
suit, damages received would be on account of a physical harm, and
would compensate Abe not only for his pain and suffering but also for
108 Burke, 504 U.S. at 248.
109 Section 104(a)(2) is per se arbitrary because there is no clear reason for distinguishing
between physical and nonphysical injury. Further complicating matters is the possibility that
those with borderline cases will be faced with the inconvenience of and cost of engaging in two
suits--one for the initial tort, and another over the taxability of the recovery received.
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his lost human capital-the use of his legs. As Abe was able to con-
tinue working normally (ignoring time lost due to hospitalization),
damages would not represent any type of substitute for wages. 10
Because the requirements of section 104(a)(2)-recovery received on
account of a physical harm-have been satisfied, an award in this
case would fall squarely under the provision and thus be excludable
from income. Any punitive damages would of course be taxable.
Not all cases are as clear as Abe's, however. The physical injury
requirement of section 104(a)(2) is the result of a seemingly arbitrary
decision to pare back a tax exclusion to satisfy a desire to increase
revenue, and it likewise can lead to arbitrary results. All other things
being equal, why should one who suffers a broken arm have a recov-
ery for the accident (even the amount that goes above and beyond
medical expenses) excluded from income while another who loses his
job and reputation would pay tax on proceeds from a defamation suit?
The statute makes this unfortunate distinction without any real expla-
nation from Congress as to why it does so. Because appellate-level
litigation on the subject is far from common, it seems apparent that
courts are taking a bright-line approach in interpreting the statute, or
at the very least that appellate courts seem hesitant to disturb a lower
court's determination of what is or is not a physical injury.
While distinguishing between those with physical and nonphysical
harms is inherently arbitrary when no reason exists for doing so, a
more problematic source of arbitrariness in section 104(a)(2) cases is
the ambiguity in what exactly constitutes a physical injury. How se-
vere must an injury be to be "physical" under the statute? Is a
stubbed toe enough, or must the digit appear in the courtroom in a
plastic baggie?"' Other issues of ambiguity exist in terms of what
kind of injury is sufficient for exclusion under the statute: for exam-
ple, what if one develops an ulcer after swallowing years of discrimi-
nation at work? Or, consider Charlie's case: Although Charlie ini-
tially sustained no physical harm, defamation and its direct effects
contributed heavily to an undeniably physical sickness-pneumonia.
Again, taken literally, as many courts might do considering the gen-
eral favoritism granted bright-line rules, modem section 104(a)(2)
would seem to deny Charlie the ability to exclude his recovery from
income.
0 Note that although Schleier used an auto accident example to illustrate when wages
might not be includable in income, this appears to be the exception rather than the rule. See
Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
111 Although these are extreme examples, there exists a broad spectrum of injury in be-
tween.
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This position is not without support, either. At first glance, a foot-
note to the 1996 amendment's legislative history seemingly adopts
this view. The footnote suggests that "[i]t is intended that the term
emotional distress includes symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headache,
stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress.,"' 2
These are truly all symptoms; however, the footnote is silent as to
more serious conditions that develop as a result of emotional dis-
tress-e.g., pneumonia, heart attack, mental breakdown, and so forth.
Further, what about a more contemporary concern-stress-triggered
immune system disorders?'13 Again, the footnote says nothing.
All may not be lost in trying to clarify the result of such a situa-
tion, however. In the legislative history to the 1996 amendment to the
statute, Congress specifically allowed, through recovery for a loss of
consortium claim, exclusion of damages for a nonphysical injury re-
sulting from another's physical injury."14  The fact that Congress
would do so seems to lend weight to the idea that physical injury re-
sulting from one's own nonphysical injury could be treated likewise;
otherwise, the statute would implicitly place more value in the physi-
cal body of another than in a taxpayer's own intangible human capi-
tal.
One final issue remains, though. Under the Schleier causation re-
quirement, would Charlie's sickness be directly attributable to the
harm suffered or is it too far removed for the purposes of causation?
This is not clear. A court reading the modern statute literally and
viewing the initial harm as the determinative injury would likely force
Charlie to pay taxes on his recovery. On the other hand, a court tak-
ing a broader view of the situation could easily note that pneumonia is
a physical sickness and allow Charlie exclusion under the statute.
Thus, by requiring courts to distinguish between physical and non-
physical injury and examine sometimes unclear chains of causation,
the ambiguity of the physical injury requirement of section 104(a)(2)
creates the possibility of arbitrariness in application. As such, the
taxability of an award for an injury such as Charlie's would thus be
unclear and left to the discretion (and potentially arbitrary applica-
tion) of the judicial system. The only clear thing about a recovery for
32H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 n.56 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1792, 1793 n.56.
1
3 See Jennifer Warner, Too Much Stress Hinders Immune Svstem, at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/53/61245.htm (Nov. 4, 2002) (noting the negative effects
of stress on the immune system).
1 4 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792,
1793 ("Damages (other than punitive damages) received by an individual on account of a claim
for loss of consortium due to the physical injury or physical sickness of such individual's spouse
are excludable from gross income.").
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an injury such as Charlie's is that the taxability of the award under the
modem section 104(a)(2) is anything but clear.
What of the case of Jane Doe, however, whose broken hand de-
prived her of the ability to teach children to play the piano, an under-
taking of extreme importance to her? Ms. Doe suffered an indisputa-
bly physical injury-a broken hand-but the true harm came from the
distress caused by her inability to engage in that which she loves.
When she receives a recovery for the drunk driver's negligence, will
the award be excluded from taxation based on the broken hand or
would a court look at the fact that the hand is otherwise healed and
deny that section 104(a)(2) applies? Because of the provision's
physical injury requirement, a court will be forced to make a judg-
ment of what harm the recovery was intended to remedy, and this
may not be consistent with where the true harm occurs.
The legislative history to the 1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2)
suggests that damages for such an intangible harm rooted in a tangible
injury may be excludable, but, as with Charlie's case, the result is not
clear.' 5 Yet again, whereas pre-1996 there would have been no issue
as to the taxability of the award, the addition of a physical injury re-
quirement to the statute results in the potential both for arbitrariness
by a court and needless litigation over a scant two pages of legislative
history.
Finally, what of the question of the requisite degree of physical in-
jury required for a harm to be "physical" for the purposes of section
104(a)(2)? For instance, suppose a taxpayer receives an award in a
negligence suit for various injuries-for example, a bad back as well
as emotional distress. Must his back be broken to meet the require-
ment of a physical injury under the statute, or is a severe blow that
causes pain while sleeping enough? Technically, both injuries are
physical, but they vary greatly in degree. By requiring a physical
injury, section 104(a)(2) thus places the judicial system in the role of
determining what degree of physical injury is sufficient and thus who
can enjoy the statute's benefits. As has been emphasized up to this
point, leaving matters to the discretion of the courts opens the door to
potential arbitrariness; leaving matters to such discretion without a
coherent theory from which courts can draw reason nearly guarantees
such arbitrariness.
Thus, while it is possible that Congress intended to simplify sec-
tion 104(a)(2) by adding the requirement that any personal injury
under the provision be physical in nature, the actual result is anything
but clear. By distinguishing between taxpayers with physical and
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nonphysical injuries without any discemable logical basis for doing
so-whether in human capital or any other theory-the statute is by
definition arbitrary. Further, the physical injury requirement creates
ambiguity, with the possibility of allowing recoveries for minor
physical harms to be excluded from taxation while recoveries for
traumatic nonphysical harms are not. Likewise, the tax treatment of a
physical harm stemming from a nonphysical injury is unclear, such as
with Charlie, as is a situation where a physical harm ultimately causes
much more severe intangible distress, as is the case with Jane. Fi-
nally, the issue remains of how much physical harm is required for
exemption-is a twisted ankle sufficient, or must one suffer a broken
bone, for example?
By creating this ambiguity through the addition of a physical in-jury requirement to section 104(a)(2), Congress has saddled the judi-
cial system with the responsibility to answer these questions for itself,
and this in turn creates the potential for arbitrary application.' 16 If our
legal system truly strives for fairness and equity, this is anything but a
desirable situation.
VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO A PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT: A
BETTER WAY EXISTS
Having the critics praise you is like having the hangman say
you've got a pretty neck.
-Eli Wallach
As this Note has aimed to illustrate, in reaching its current state
section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code has devolved from a
relatively straightforward statute into a narrow exclusion. As a result,
the provision no longer embodies a desire not to tax returns of human
capital, nor does it support the simple notion that Congress acted al-
truistically in enacting the section. Through its physical injury re-
quirement, the modem statute similarly fails to stay true to its explic-
itly documented roots in traditional tort law. Even with these theo-
retical inconsistencies aside, there exist more practical, and thus ar-
guably more important, considerations. Not only is the statute itself
arbitrary by drawing without logical support a distinction between
116 As alluded to, supra note 108, another inherent but easily overlooked burden on the tax-
payer is the requirement that he engage in two suits--one for the initial tort and another to argue
over the taxability of the recovery received. Part of these litigation costs could include, for
example, the need to hire two doctors as expert witnesses-one to establish the existence of the
initial injury and another to establish its physical nature. Not only does the taxpayer thus incur
additional costs, but a large percentage of the recovery may be unreachable for years while
litigation is ongoing.
2005] 1067
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sufferers of physical and nonphysical injury, but by doing so it also
creates ambiguity and opens the door to interpretation and thus poten-
tially arbitrary application by the judicial system.
All of this is fine and well, but why chastise Congress for its deci-
sion if no better choice exists? After all, it is easier to criticize others'
work than to attempt to improve upon it. There do, however, exist
alternatives to the modern version of section 104(a)(2), the most vi-
able of which is an option that has essentially been present all along:
Congress could do away with the statute's physical injury require-
ment and return the provision to its pre-1996 form, albeit with certain
conditions.
A. A Return to the Post-1989 Statute with Certain Conditions
Assuming that the theory of human capital serves as the basis for
section 104(a)(2), in returning the provision to allow exclusion from
income recoveries based on personal injury, Congress should retain
the post-1989 view that punitive damages should not be excluded
from income. Such recoveries cannot represent a return of capital and
instead constitute a windfall no matter how one examines the situa-
tion. 117 Further, assuming that human capital is itself an accession to
wealth, such "accessions" are not directly taxable for ordinary, unin-
jured taxpayers. For these parties, their capital is not taxed until it is
used to produce earnings. Therefore, in the interest of equity (among
other considerations), any award that represents lost or back wages
should likewise be included in income. Such sums would be taxed
anyway 1 8 and do not substitute for destroyed human capital; in some
cases, an even stronger argument for taxation exists as victims did not
actually work to earn them. '19
The modified provision would likely require a Schleier-like test to
determine personal injury and causation, albeit with somewhat clearer
lines. This would not require any more analysis than courts already
perform, however; even under the modem statute, an injury must be
"personal"'' 20 and a recovery must be awarded on account of that
117 See O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1996) ("[Punitive damages] do not
compensate for any kind of loss."). Further, one of the primary purposes of such damages, to
punish the defendant for his "evil behavior" or to make an example of him, has no compensa-
tory function that would be excluded from taxation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467-68
(4th ed. 1968). But see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 619 (2003)
(noting that the early focus of punitive damages was actually on the insult to the victim).
118 I.R.C. § 61 (2003).
119This is not intended to diminish the significance of a victim's suffering in any way.
120 Note that use of the term "personal injury" here is not to suggest the paradigm of per-
sonal injury (physical injury) as a requirement, but rather it serves to differentiate relevant
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harm.' 2' Thus, no matter what the system, courts will have to decide
at what point compensation does not substitute for injury.
Perhaps a good place at which to draw the causational line would
be at all injuries sustained at the time of suit. Given the amount of
time that would elapse between the initial injury, the recovery on be-
half of that injury, the taxpayer's filing of taxes and IRS's rejection of
their exclusion, and the subsequent suit to resolve the issue, there
exists a sufficient window in which injuries stemming from the initial
accident would manifest themselves. Further, after a certain point,
injuries suffered would be irrelevant, as the plaintiff would have al-
ready paid taxes (or attempted to withhold them) on the recovery. 122
Although the proposed system is by no means perfect, it avoids the
arbitrariness of taxing those who suffer nonphysical injury while
those who show some physical manifestation escape taxation. Such a
provision would benefit Charlie, the most problematic of the cases
discussed: assuming his pneumonia developed at an early enough
point, unlike under the current statute, all of his damages (except for
recovered lost income and punitive awards) received would be ex-
cluded as they are personal, tort-based injuries. The modified provi-
sion thus allows the system to take account of all of Charlie's
harms-the initial injury to his character (defamation) and the subse-
quent pneumonia-and he would thus be treated the same under the
statute as someone whose physical sickness led to a nonphysical in-
jury.
Likewise, Jane would enjoy the benefits of the statute without be-
ing forced to engage in needless litigation over whether her recovery
compensates her for an injured hand or the distress stemming from
that injury. Further, by retaining the requirement that an injury be
personal, the provision would not become so broad as to make it im-
practical and unworkable. Thus not only would the statute be simpler
harms from property damage and breach of contract claims which have their own, simpler rules.
121 Admittedly, the proposed change will not eliminate disagreements over what constitutes
a "personal" injury for the purposes of section 104(a)(2). This has been, and will continue to be,
a source of contention. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1992) (struggling
with what is or is not a "personal" injury). Further, eliminating the "personal" requirement
altogether would not be feasible; this would vastly broaden the provision to encompass such
claims as contractual damages.
122 Although this might prevent Charlie from excluding income based on his pneumonia (if
it occurred after the time of suit), he would have been allowed to exclude his award for defama-
tion-a harm to his character-anyway. Likewise, in cases where nonphysical injury develops
from a physical injury (such as Jane Doe), exclusion could be difficult unless the plaintiff was
beginning to suffer the injury at the time of suit. In Ms. Doe's case, with a crushed hand it is
likely that she would know by that time of her inability to play the piano. If her impairment had
not manifested itself by the time Ms. Doe got to court, the issue would be irrelevant as there
would be no recovery for it and thus nothing to exclude from income.
2005] 1069
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
in application, its benefits would still be available to a reasonably
select group of taxpayers.
One potential, and unfounded, fear is that such a change would re-
sult in an increase in frivolous suits filed for hard-to-define intangible
harms. While this is possible, is a plaintiff who would not have filed
a lawsuit before going to do so now simply because he will have to
pay fewer (if any) taxes on the recovery? 23 Notably, doing away
with the section 104(a)(2)'s physical injury requirement would not
open the door to new claims; rather, it would simply affect the tax
treatment of existing recoveries.
B. Other Alternatives to the Modern Section 104(a)(2)
Instead of removing the provision's physical injury requirement,
Congress could simply do away with section 104(a)(2) altogether.
Congress is not required to exclude any recoveries received on ac-
count of personal injury if it deems that the exclusion is not neces-
sary. Throwing out the provision entirely, however, would result in
taxpayers being taxed on what is essentially (at least under the theory
of human capital) a return of capital, and this would be inconsistent
with other portions of the Code.' 24 More important, uninjured per-
sons who have acquired human capital are not taxed on their gain, so
why should one who receives compensation for human capital of
which they have been deprived be treated differently?
Another option would be to tax the injured party only on the part
of a recovery that exceeds his initial basis in the asset (his person).
This would, after all, be consistent with the notion that a taxpayer
should avoid tax liability only on that portion of an award that repre-
sents a return of capital. Both the current and proposed statutes rec-
ognize this to the extent that wages and punitive
damages-undeniable accessions to wealth-are not eligible for ex-
clusion under section 104(a)(2). The fatal flaw in such a system,
however, is that it would require courts to determine a taxpayer's
basis in his own person. As discussed earlier, this is much more eas-
ily said than done, and the amount of gain in a given situation would
123 It is possible, of course, that if a potential recovery were small enough and the rate of
taxation high enough, that some potential plaintiffs could be deterred from filing suit under the
current system. Assuming that the potential plaintiff and his lawyer make such calculations,
they would necessarily consider such factors as potential value of the claim, probability of
success, and costs likely to be incurred. For a more technical overview of the economic deci-
sion-making process in filing suit, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 334-50 (2d ed. 1997).
124 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2003); I.R.C. §§ 1011-12 (2003). See also ANDREWS, su-
pra note 20, at 77 (giving an overview of the Code and the concept of return of capital).
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necessarily depend on which theory of human capital's origin one
adopted.
One final possibility is that Congress could amend the statute to al-
low exclusion from income recoveries based on any injury. As stated
previously, however, this would broaden the statute to the point
where it is no longer workable; it would become a haven for anyone
with any kind of injury seeking to avoid taxation.
Thus, while Congress could broaden section 104(a)(2), alter it in
other ways or do away with it altogether, the best choice for purposes
of both fairness and application remains to simply do away with the
provision's physical injury requirement while maintaining a few se-
lect conditions.
CONCLUSION
In the end, while there is no perfect solution to the problems of
ambiguity and arbitrariness caused by the physical injury requirement
of section 104(a)(2), a simple reversion to the old form along with a
few modifications would go a long way in addressing the provision's
shortcomings. Not only would the statute return to a solid theoretical
grounding in the concept of restoration of human capital, but it would
neither arbitrarily distinguish between those who have suffered harms
different in nature but arguably equal in magnitude nor allow courts
to do the same.
Suits for tortious injury have long been a part of the legal system
and will continue to be so in the future. Not only must the law deal
with suits and issues that have presented themselves in the past, it
must be able to face new problems that arise in the future. For exam-
ple, what of a suit that recovers damages from fast-food establish-
ments that supposedly caused their customers to become overweight?
Is such an award a recovery for obesity? Even if so, is obesity even a
physical injury for the purposes of section 104(a)(2)? Or, on the other
hand, would such a recovery be for the clogged arteries and heart
attacks caused by the condition? Perhaps an award would actually
compensate for the "shame and humiliation" suffered by the over-
weight plaintiff? Whatever the validity of such claims, requiring a
showing of a physical injury for tax exclusion can only create the
potential for disputes and differing treatment of taxpayers who have
suffered similar harms.
Likewise, although such cases are currently in their infancy, con-
sider the possibility of a suit against brewers and liquor companies for
allegedly advertising to minors. In considering physical and non-
physical injury, how would the present-day section 104(a)(2) treat a
20051 1071
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
recovery for a taxpayer who developed sclerosis of the liver after
starting to drink heavily at 15? The result seems clear enough. But
what about a depressed mother whose 17-year-old son was killed
after he had one beer too many before getting behind the wheel?
What of the plaintiff who escaped liver damage, but whose memory
was severely damaged after he began heavily drinking at a young
age? Is that a physical injury for the purposes of the statute? While
the treatment of recoveries for some of these injuries would be clearer
than others, the fact remains that these are but a few of the plethora of
injuries that could present themselves in such lawsuits. It is clear,
then, that such issues of taxability will have to be resolved one way or
the other and simply are not going to disappear.
These are but some of the potential issues dealing with the scope
of section 104(a)(2) that will likely arise in the near future. Neither
the tax code nor the legal system is perfect; nor is it at all likely that
they ever will be. In the case of this single provision of the volumi-
nous Internal Revenue Code, however, Congress has the ability to
take a step in that direction with one simple change. Because while
death and taxes may both be certainties, so should be the treatment
one receives when he is asked to pay those taxes.
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